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Foreword
What Happened to Shared Prosperity 
and Full Employment and How to Get 
Them Back: A Seussian Perspective 
Richard B. Freeman
Harvard University and 
National Bureau of Economic Research
The conference “Reconnecting to Work” was held on April 1–2, 
2011, as the United States suffered its worst job market since the Great 
Depression. Reconnecting to work, indeed! With 9–10 percent unem-
ployment and little sign of substantive job growth in the foreseeable 
future, American workers needed more help to find work than at any 
time since the 1930s. Even if job growth were to miraculously pick up, 
most workers would have trouble keeping their heads above water for 
years to come. For nearly four decades the benefits of economic growth 
have gone almost entirely to a small sliver of wealthy Americans. The 
vast bulk of workers struggled with stagnant real wages and high con-
sumer debt to remain in the middle class. Inequality rose to levels off 
the map for a major advanced country and exceeded levels in most 
third-world countries. Contrary to what many Americans believe, social 
mobility in the United States was below that for most other advanced 
countries.1 
Something or someone had taken shared prosperity and full employ-
ment from the American people. Something or someone was disman-
tling the road to the middle class on which the United States was built, 
and with it the American dream. Who or what could that be?
The first place where economists seek an answer to changes in eco-
nomic outcomes is in the operation of markets. Viewing the U.S. labor 
market as highly competitive and responsive to market forces, some 
economists explain the stagnation of real wages in terms of (unmea-
sured) technologically driven shifts in demand for labor that favor 
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the highly skilled over the less skilled. But changes in skill premium 
explain only a small proportion of increased inequality. Most of the 
rise in inequality occurs within observationally equivalent groups—
among persons with the same age, gender, race, education, math and 
literacy test scores, and so on—rather than across skill groups. And it 
is difficult to understand why in a highly flexible job market firms cut 
employment rapidly in recession but failed to increase employment in 
the ensuing recovery. To fit the observed pattern of change, analysts 
must go beyond the basic flexible market model to consider institutions, 
unions, executive compensation, modes of corporate governance, and 
governmental policies. 
In the spirit of the interdisciplinary Reconnecting to Work confer-
ence, I explored what other social sciences said about the loss of shared 
prosperity and jobs crisis. Sociology focuses on the behavior of the poor 
and the measurement/meaning of class but also offers network analysis 
that quantifies the connections among the elite. Political science docu-
ments the importance of lobbying in determining the rules that govern 
how markets operate and of the revolving door between public service 
and lobbying activities. Social psychology shows how readily authority 
figures and settings can influence people to behave with little regard to 
others even without monetary incentives. But neither economics nor the 
other social sciences gave me the overarching vision or narrative about 
who or what was undoing the U.S. middle class.
With the time for my presentation at the conference growing short, 
I widened my search. As a youth I read widely in literature, from the 
Greek tragedies to Alice in Wonderland to Charles Bukowski. Did the 
world of literature offer an analogy or a clue to the story? Eureka! Yes, 
there was one narrative that seemed to provide insight into the econom-
ics of lost prosperity and jobs, and it was by the world’s most famous 
and accomplished writer and poet of children’s verse—Dr. Seuss, mas-
ter of the trisyllabic meter. 
Dr. Seuss? Many of the experts at the conference would recall The 
Cat in the Hat (1957a) and wonder what hat I was wearing when Seuss 
popped into my head as offering a framework for understanding the 
country’s economic woes. Hopefully the evidence would convince them 
(and you), as it convinced me, that the answer to who stole American 
prosperity and full employment lies in the classic Seuss tale How the 
Grinch Stole Christmas (1957b) and its successor stories. 
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THE GRINCHES OF WALL STREET 
The Grinch is an illustrated book. Rereading your copy, you will 
surely notice, as I did, the uncanny resemblance of the illustrations of 
the snarly heartless cave-dwelling Grinch to the bankers, mortgage 
brokers, and Wall Street–dwelling financiers who sold “liars’ loans” 
to Americans seeking home ownership, sliced and diced mortgages to 
hide the risks to investors seeking safe assets, created credit default 
swaps and exotic derivatives that paid if businesses collapsed or peo-
ple absconded on debts, and sold clients financial products that they 
believed would fail. Those dark brows, sour Grinchy grin, and piercing 
eyes—if the Grinch were a bit pudgier or Bernard Madoff a bit leaner, 
they’d be kissing cousins. 
So who plays the Grinch in the U.S. economy? According to the 
Wall Street occupiers, it is the upper 1 percent of the income distribu-
tion. More accurately, it is the upper 0.1 percent that gained essentially 
all of the economic growth of the past 40 years. In 1970 the top 0.1 per-
cent in income had 2.7 percent of national income. Their income was 27 
times the mean income. In 2007 the top 0.1 percent had 12.3 percent of 
national income.2 Their income was 123 times the mean. But these fig-
ures understate the disparity in income between the top 0.1 percent and 
the average American. The average includes the income of the top 0.1 
percent. Comparing the income of those in the top 0.1 percent with the 
income of those in the bottom 99.9 percent raises the estimated ratio to 
140 times in 2007. Moreover, income distributions are “right-skewed” 
so that a person in the median of the income distribution makes less than 
the average. In 2007 the median income of families was 77.8 percent 
of the mean income in the United States, suggesting that the income of 
the upper 0.1 percent was on the order of 180 times the median income 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2011, Table F-8).  
Who, you may ask, comprises the upper 0.1 percent? Bakija, Cole, 
and Heim (2010, Table 3) find that in 2005, about 64 percent of the 
top 0.1 percent were executives, managers, supervisors, and finan-
cial professionals, or worked in real estate. The 403 or so billionaires 
in the annual Forbes list are there. The top corporate executives and 
Wall Street bankers are there. Following the 1999 repeal of the Glass- 
Steagall Act provisions that separated commercial banks that hold 
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deposits from the riskier investment banks that issue securities, the 
finance sector expanded. Finance absorbed a disproportionate 40 per-
cent of business profits. It hired some of the country’s best and brightest 
to develop new financial instruments, which it peddled as essentially 
risk free, all the while enveloping the real economy with a highly lev-
eraged financial house of cards—an estimated $22 of derivatives for 
every dollar of goods and services produced in 2009 (Matai 2009)! 
While some high-income recipients made their money primarily 
through salaries, for many, million-dollar salaries were chump change, 
dwarfed by earnings from stock options or restricted shares that gave 
them ownership claims on the firm or by bonuses paid as incentive pay. 
When the firm’s share price rises, the owners of the options and shares 
benefit even if the price rise was due to factors outside their control. 
When the stock market crashed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some 
firms gave out new options at the abnormally low market prices, which 
paid off handsomely when the market recovered. In general, when 
share prices fall and drive options “under water,” boards of directors 
give out new options at the low prices to “reincentivize” executives. At 
the top of the income distribution, the IRS reports that the 400 persons 
with the highest adjusted gross income earned 10 percent of all capital 
gains, 4 percent of all interest, and 4 percent of all dividends received 
in the United States in 2007 (Mi2g 2009). Great ways to make a living 
if you can get it.
The implosion of Wall Street and ensuing recession affected the 
entire economy. The federal government bailed out the banks with 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) monies. The Federal Reserve 
loaned $1.2 trillion dollars to the banks to help them recapitalize. The 
Obama administration’s stimulus package—tax cuts, support of state 
and local governments, and spending initiatives—helped the economy 
recover while adding to the federal deficit. But just as the gains from 
the economic growth had gone disproportionately to a small number, 
the gains from the recovery went disproportionately to a small number. 
Firms gave out options at low share prices when the stock market was 
weak, which allowed executives to clean up in a market that owed its 
recovery to the bailout and stimulus. On the day the Reconnecting to 
Work conference began, USA Today reported that CEO pay had jumped 
27 percent in 2010 under the headline “CEO Pay Soars While Workers’ 
Pay Stalls” (Kantz and Hansen 2011).3
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But while executive pay and corporate profits recovered smartly, 
there was virtually no recovery in the job market. And the recession-
induced deficits in the public sector produced cutbacks in government 
employment and spending with threats of more to come. 
The Resilience of the Grinches
How the Grinch Stole Christmas ends when the Whos overcome 
their disappointment at the stolen Christmas stockings, presents, and 
cookies, and join hands to celebrate Christmas because Christmas 
meant more to them than material goods bought in a store. This behav-
ior shocked the Grinch to a born-again moment. Seuss reports the event: 
“ . . . in Who-ville they say, That the Grinch’s small heart grew three 
sizes that day.” 
Given the physiological problems of tripling even a small interior 
organ, note that Seuss does not himself claim this is what happened. He 
just reports what folks in Who-ville say. In any case, caught up with 
the Christmas spirit, the Grinch returned the stolen goods to the com-
munity. Then, to the surprise of all, “He himself . . . The Grinch carved 
up the roast beast” for Christmas dinner. 
This is where Seuss and economic reality part. No one, least of 
all an economist, expects Americans to take the loss of prosperity and 
full employment in the Christmas spirit of the Whos, holding hands 
and singing. Unemployment reduces happiness, creates mental distress, 
worsens lifetime career prospects, and reduces family income, leading 
some into poverty.4 Surveys show that the vast majority of Americans 
have a dim view of the direction in which the country is heading: less 
than 25 percent believe that their children will do better economically 
than they do (Bendavid 2011; Rasmussen Reports 2011). 
Similarly, no one, least of all an economist, expected the Wall Street 
Grinches to have a spiritual rebirth and return their bailout-created gains 
to the country. But given the near-death experience of finance, I antici-
pated some change in behavior: apologies for what Wall Street had 
done to the country, thanks to taxpayers for bailing them out, and spe-
cial thanks to the Obama administration for not siccing the FDIC and 
FBI onto them, as Presidents Reagan and Bush had done to the bankers 
who created the 1980s savings and loan crisis, and as New Deal inves-
tigators had done to their predecessors in the Great Depression. Given 
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that even conservative Americans harbored distrust and anger toward 
the bankers, it seemed a good time for them to lay low, take a modest 
million or two in pay, donate to philanthropic causes, and maybe even 
volunteer to help the nation rebuild shared prosperity for all. 
Instead, the Grinches of finance behaved just as the economists’ 
model of homo oeconimicus predicts people behave when money is 
at stake. Evincing neither remorse nor interest in any interest but their 
own, Wall Street financiers fought to restore the past economic order 
in which they and their compatriots in the upper income brackets gar-
nered all the gains from economic growth. A consumer financial protec-
tion agency to protect citizens in financial transactions? A Tobin tax on 
financial transactions? The Volcker rule? Higher capital requirements 
on banks? A policy to break up the banks too big to fail? Strength-
ened regulatory powers for the Securities Exchange Commission? Tax 
increases on the wealthy? “Nevermore,” quoth the Grinch—or was that 
the Raven? Increased unionization to protect the interests of the middle 
class? Unions? “Forget them.” The middle class? “Charge them debit 
card fees, the dumb marks.”
After the conference, I worried that How the Grinch Stole Christ-
mas had too rosy an ending to represent the U.S. economy. The Grinch 
looked like a Wall Street operator, but his born-again soft spot would 
have made Gordon Gekko and his cronies cackle. After all, “Greed 
is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the 
essence of the evolutionary spirit.”5 Perhaps I needed a tougher vision 
of the grinches of the world than Dr. Seuss offered.
Fourteen years after he published the Grinch, Dr. Seuss developed 
that tougher vision in The Lorax (1971). This is the only Seuss book that 
puts economic behavior at the heart of the story. It is a dark, grim tale 
of how the entrepreneurial Once-ler found a way to turn Truffula trees 
into Thneeds, “which everyone, EVERYONE, EVERYONE needs!” 
Crazy with greed, the Once-ler pushed production to the point where 
it destroyed the environment, destroyed every Truffula tree, turned the 
land into a horrific rustbelt of empty factories and buildings fallen apart, 
with “no more work to be done.” Sadly, the book displays only the 
Once-ler’s green hands and beady eyes, so whether the Once-ler looks 
more like Gordon Gekko or Mr. Madoff or—name your favorite or least 
favorite Wall Street banker—I do not know. My guess is that the Once-
ler is in the Grinch family, but I could be wrong. 
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I did a Google search to find out more about the Grinch after his 
Christmas epiphany. The slithery sneering creature starred in a 1977 TV 
show called Halloween Is Grinch Night. Here Seuss painted a harsher 
character whose sole goal was to terrorize the Whos on Halloween 
by releasing his bag of horrors onto Who-ville. The only thing that 
stopped the Grinch was a brave, bespectacled little Who, who delayed 
the Grinch until past the witching hour. At the show’s end the Grinch 
threatens to come back the next Halloween to do his evil work. In the 
Hollywood remake of the show, I envision Brooksley Born, the head of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under President Clinton, 
playing the brave little Who. Born wanted to regulate the risky deriv-
atives market, a move for which she was viciously attacked by Bob 
Rubin, Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, and Arthur Levitt, and forced 
to resign from her job. As for the bag of horrors, we all know what it 
contains: more and more dangerous derivatives, credit default swaps, 
mortgage-backed securities. If the Christmas Grinch is too soft for you, 
think of Once-ler or the Grinch of Halloween. 
THE WAy FORWARD: HORTONOMICS 
There is another side to the economics of Dr. Seuss—a positive mes-
sage that economists of every political stripe find particularly appeal-
ing. This is the story of investment in Horton Hatches the Egg (1940). 
Recall, if you will, the situation. Mayzie, a lazy bird, has laid an egg and 
wants someone to replace her atop the nest so she can have a “short” holi-
day. She inveigles Horton to sit on the egg—not an easy task for a huge 
elephant—but he fixes the tree branch to hold him until Mayzie returns. 
Horton sits on the egg through summer, autumn, winter, and spring, and 
all the while, Mayzie does not appear. Seuss reports that she was partying 
in Palm Beach, but I heard that she was actually on the Cayman Islands 
with the corporate Grinches who find the tax haven more profitable than 
building job-creating businesses. If only we had her Tweets to resolve 
the issue. In any case, Horton kept sitting on the egg, repeating the motif 
that we all know so well. “I meant what I said, and I said what I meant . . . 
An elephant’s faithful—one hundred percent.” 
xiv
Freeman
Hunters capture Horton and sell him, the tree, and the egg to a cir-
cus, which sees money-making potential in an elephant hatching an egg 
in a tree. It charges 10 cents a peek. When the egg hatches, Mayzie 
suddenly appears and tries to foreclose the property: “It’s MY egg!” 
she sputters. “You stole it from me. Get off of my nest and out of my 
tree.” But when the egg pops, out comes “something brand new”—an 
elephant-bird with elephant ears, tail, and trunk and wings, who stays 
with Horton. 
Horton Hatches the Egg has two messages for understanding our 
current economic situation. The first is that economic growth requires 
long-term investments—sitting on the egg. Investment in infrastruc-
ture, in R&D, in new plants and equipment, in risky innovations, and, 
in the case of the egg, the investment in human capital. Economic 
growth is harmed by short-term investments based on balloon loans or 
financial manipulations. The second message is that trust is important 
in a well-functioning economy. “I meant what I said, and I said what I 
meant.” Sellers of securities who are faithful to their clients instead of 
betting against them. Management and employees who work coopera-
tively knowing that they will divide the resultant profits. Consumers 
who know that when they pay their debts, the bank will apply their pay-
ments to the debt with the highest interest rate.
In the tradition of attaching names to economic policies—the New 
Deal, the Fair Deal, Reaganomics, Clintonomics—I propose that poli-
cies to reverse the trend in inequality and restore full employment be 
labeled Hortonomics. I offer one specific policy that would fit the Hor-
ton label. This is to modify the corporate tax code so that firms can-
not deduct as a cost of business huge payments to top executives in 
the form of pay for performance unless the incentive plan covers all 
workers.6 Currently firms cannot deduct health and retirement plans as 
costs of business unless the plans cover all workers, so this modification 
would extend that practice to incentive pay plans. The proposal would 
increase the proportion of American workers covered by incentive pay. 
The workers would benefit from their firms’ economic performance to 
a greater extent than now, which would motivate them to produce more.
During the Great Recession, firms in most OECD countries adapted 
work-sharing policies that traded lower productivity to save jobs while 
firms in the United States did the opposite, shedding workers so rapidly 
that productivity increased at record levels (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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2011). In developing countries also, policies were shifting in favor of 
workers. Brazil and other Latin American countries raised minimum 
wages, used tax monies from the wealthy to fund education and trans-
fer programs for the poor, and experienced both falling inequality and 
increased economic growth. Perhaps most telling, China adopted a pol-
icy of strengthening unions and labor laws to fight inequality.
But while Hortonomics had traction in other countries, it seemed 
outside U.S. political discourse, which was focused on cutting the fed-
eral deficit, and where many viewed discussion of inequality as raising 
a red banner of class warfare. The Whos in the United States who suf-
fered from stagnant real earnings and unemployment seemed invisible 
in debates over economic policy. In April I could not see what would 
change the situation. 
And Then . . . the American Whos Speak 
They spoke up first in New York City on September 17, 2011, when 
the Occupy Wall Street protestors sat down in Zuccotti Park around 
Wall Street under banners that read “We are the 99 percent.” The protes-
tors targeted economic inequality, corporate greed and corruption, and 
the dominance of Wall Street over the government as the main prob-
lems that troubled them. But they offered no explicit political or policy 
agenda and were suspicious of both Democrats and Republicans. The 
New York event set off similar protests in other U.S. cities and commu-
nities and spread to other parts of the world. 
It is unclear how much staying power the occupiers have or whether 
their protests will influence policy. Unions, environmentalists, and 
many others on the left support them. Many leaders, from the president 
of the United States to the mayor of New York to the head of the Fed-
eral Reserve, expressed sympathy for and recognition of the validity of 
their concerns. Republican politicians have been more critical of the 
occupiers and defensive of Wall Street. At the minimum the occupiers 
have brought the rise in inequality and joblessness to the forefront of 
national discourse.
The 1954 book Horton Hears a Who! offers Seussian insight into 
what happens when Whos speak up and others hear their voice. The 
book begins “on the fifteenth of May” (in the big scheme of things, 
just a smidgeon away from the occupiers’ first protest on September 
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17). Horton is taking a bath when he hears a small noise from a speck 
of dust in the air. His elephant ears allow him to hear the voices of the 
Whos even though he cannot see them. The smaller-eared denizens of 
the jungle mock Horton for hearing voices until the mayor of Who-ville 
gets every Who “to make noises in greater amounts.” Crying out as a 
group, “Their voices were heard! They rang out loud and clear.” Horton 
and the other animals then join to protect the Whos because “a person’s 
a person, no matter how small.” 
Now that the Whos in this country have spoken and some lead-
ers have begun to listen to their concerns, I am more optimistic than I 
was at the Reconnecting to Work conference that the United States will 
come out of Wall Street’s financial implosion and the Great Recession 
with reforms that will restore full employment and prosperity for all 
citizens. I hope that economics and social science and, more broadly, 
policy analysis, are up to the task of developing efficient programs to 
help attain this goal. 
Notes 
 1. For data on inequality, see the Gini coefficients from the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the United Nations: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries 
_by_income_equality (accessed June 5, 2012). For data on social mobility, see 
OECD (2010, Chapter 5).
 2. These data are from Piketty and Saez (2003). The figures for 2008 show a small 
drop in the share of the upper 0.1 percent due to the collapse of the stock market. 
I use 2007 data as likely to be more representative of the situation after the mar-
ket recovered. There are only modest differences in the shares between 2007 and 
2008.
 3. An updated and lengthier analysis is available at http://www.usatoday.com/ 
money/companies/management/story/CEO-pay-2010/45634384/1 (accessed 
June 5, 2012).
  4. See Chapters 2 and 4 in this volume. In Chapter 4 of the 2008 Employment Out-
look, the OECD documents the deleterious effects of unemployment on mental 
health using panel data for several countries. Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) 
show that job displacement of blue-collar males increases mortality by 50 per-
cent to 100 percent. Studies of college graduates (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos, von 
Wachter, and Heisz 2006) show that a cohort that graduates in a recession suffers 
lower income for the bulk of its working life. Finally, Gallup polls show that 
the proportion of unemployed Americans diagnosed with depression is twice as 
high as the proportion of fully employed persons, and rises with the length of un-
employment. http://www.gallup.com/poll/139604/worry-sadness-stress-increase 
-length-unemployment.aspx (accessed June 5, 2012).  
xvii
Foreword
 5.  IMDb’s page for Wall Street, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291/quotes (ac-
cessed June 5, 2012). 
  6. For the details of this plan see www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/03/worker 
_productivity.html (accessed June 5, 2012).
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